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Somebody asked me to post the fingerprints of our SSL certificate. I sent
email, but it appears to have not arrived.
The certificate's fingerprints are:
SHA1: C3:B7:FD:6B:9C:9B:2C:13:DF:07:8E:61:55:E2:19:51:D4:35:37:98
MD5: 8B:FD:FB:19:B8:06:04:8C:13:7B:D3:F4:1F:34:FC:77
Because I'm using a cacert.org free certificate, I have to update it every
six months. From now on I'll post the fingerprints, signed with my PGP key,
when I update.
There is some concern with the Debian key generation problem. I don't think
our certificate has that.
The TMM certificate was generated by cacert.org.
http://blog.cacert.org/says:
"Luckly, the CAcert Root Class 1 and 3 keys are not affected as these were
generated before the vulnerability was introduced into Debian[3] in
September 2006. The process that signs CSR (certificate signing requests)
and therefore all signed public keys does not use any key generation, so
they are not affected by CAcert. Conclusion: CAcert does NOT have to
reissue every signed certificate."
cacert uses Debian internally, so there is a tiny chance that somebody
snuck into their system using a forged SSH key, and stole their root
certificate private key. They didn't think that was enough of a threat to
regenerate their root certificate, though.
The TMM certificate's private key was generated by site5.com's automated
system. I can't find anywhere whether they use Debian for that. It appears
from /proc/version in the SSH environment on our hosting machine, that it
is Red Hat 3.4.6-9. That doesn't imply that their SSL certificate signing
request generator is also running Red Hat, but I'd call it likely.
Bill
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